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Abstract
This work describes a model-based approach for contamination event detection in water distribution systems using chlorine mea-
surements. The proposed method considers the known chlorine input injection signals, and uses multiple Monte-Carlo simulations
which run in parallel to the real system, in order to compute at each time step, bounds of the expected chlorine concentration at
the diﬀerent chlorine sensing locations. The sensor measurements are then compared with the estimated bounds and according
to a certain event logic, an event alarm ﬂag is raised when these bounds are exceeded. The methodology is applied on a realistic
benchmark network, taking into account uncertainties in the hydraulic dynamics.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of WDSA 2014.
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1. Introduction
Water utilities routinely monitor the hydraulic and quality characteristics of the water distribution system, to guar-
antee the continuous supply of good quality drinking water to all consumers. When some event occurs in the system,
such as a large-scale water contamination due to an accident or a malicious attack, this can have a dramatic eﬀect on
the society and the economy. One such case is the contamination event which occurred in 1993 in Milwaukee (USA),
which aﬀected 403,000 consumers, causing thousands of hospitalization and a number of deaths, with an estimated
medical and productivity cost of $ 96.2 million [1]. More recently, in 2014 in West Virginia (USA), 300,000 con-
sumers were aﬀected when the drinking water distribution system was accidentally polluted with crude MCHM, an
industrial chemical [2].
Water utilities typically perform manual sampling and chemical analysis, on a periodic basis, to monitor water
quality in their system. However, with manual sampling, it may take days until an event is eventually detected,
typically after the chemical analysis, or because of consumer complaints. On-line water quality sensors can be used
to enhance water quality monitoring, in real-time. Specialized water quality sensors are typically associated with high
costs, and for this reason, in practice only a few sensors are installed at certain key locations in the network. This fact
motivated signiﬁcant research on the water quality sensor placement problem in the past years [3,4]. An alternative
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to specialized sensors for contamination detection, are low-cost sensors monitoring generic water quality parameters
such as chlorine concentration, oxidation reduction potential, total organic carbon, turbidity, conductivity and pH [5].
In past research, various approaches have been proposed for addressing the problem of contamination detection,
using single or multiple-type measurements which are analysed separately or in combination, from one or more loca-
tions in the network, using model-based or model-free approaches. Among previous work, a multi-type measurement
approach at a single-location was proposed in [6], where each parameter was compared to its 3σ bounds. Other
methods such as control charts and Kalman ﬁlters have also been proposed [7]. When multiple types of sensors are
available, these can be used to compute distance metrics [8], which can then be used for contamination detection. Time
series analysis of multiple water quality parameters can be performed in the CANARY event detection tool [9,10],
provided by the US Environmental Protection Agency. Through some ﬁlter, an estimation error is computed and is
compared to an adaptive threshold which depends on the standard deviation of a moving window of measurements.
Recently, the use of artiﬁcial neural networks for modelling water quality to compute the estimation errors was
investigated, and by utilizing a sequential Bayesian rule, the contamination event probability was calculated and com-
pared with a certain threshold in order to detect an event [11]. Furthermore, in [12], this approach was extended to
consider dynamic thresholds computed with respect to the measurements from a moving window. An un-supervised
approach was proposed in [13], using a minimum-volume ellipsoid in order to bound the region of normal measure-
ments, and use a heuristic metric in order to determine the occurrence of an abnormality.
Fluctuations in water demands may cause signiﬁcant variability in water quality measurements throughout the
water distribution network, as demonstrated in [14] using Monte Carlo simulations. To accommodate uncertainty, a
Bayesian Belief Network approach was presented in [15] as a method to infer the probability of contamination.
Model-based approaches using with multiple chemical reaction dynamics have also been used for both simulation
and contamination event detection. In [16], the EPANET-MSX software [17] was used to simulate the chlorine
response to the injection of certain biological agents in a water distribution benchmark network. The underlying
assumption behind contamination event detection using surrogate water quality measurements is that contaminants
injected in drinking water will aﬀect certain key monitored parameters [18]. For example, a bacterial toxin may
decrease the concentration of free chlorine, decrease the ORP and increase the conductivity of the water. Furthermore,
in [19], chlorine and contaminant reaction models have been considered in a real-time event adaptive detection,
identiﬁcation and warning methodology, to detect and classify the contaminant.
The use of chlorine sensors speciﬁcally for contamination event detection was proposed in [20]. Due to their low
cost and wide use in water distribution networks, monitoring for contamination events using chlorine measurements
can be a low-cost solution for most water utilities. The actual chlorine reaction dynamics in most of the cases are
not known; as a result, empirical models are utilized [21]. In addition, models describing chlorine reactions with
contaminants (such as sodium arsenite and organophosphate) have been proposed [22].
Due to signiﬁcant variability in the water demands as well as the eﬀect of hydraulic and quality control actions,
the disinfectant residual at the sensor location may ﬂuctuate [23]. Therefore, the use of ﬁxed detection thresholds
for chlorine residuals can make the event detection insensitive to small or incipient contamination events. As a
consequence, certain contamination events may not be detected in time due to conservative detection thresholds, and
certain normal operation events such as an abrupt hydraulic action, may trigger false alarms. The present work extends
[23] in order to design a real-time event detection algorithm which takes into account the uncertainties as well as the
known inputs related to the quality controls.
This work proposes the development of a model-based approach for contamination event detection, using chlorine
concentration estimates from multiple Monte-Carlo simulations which run in parallel to a real system. Time-varying
upper and lower bounds of the chlorine concentrations at the sensor locations are computed at each time-step, and
an event detection logic is used to determine whether a contamination event has occurred. The numerical solvers
EPANET [24] and EPANET-MSX [17] are used to model the hydraulic and quality dynamics respectively. To illustrate
the algorithm, a large set of contamination events is simulated on a benchmark network.
The contribution of this work is the development of a model-based event detection algorithm which considers
previous quality inputs while performing randomized simulations, simultaneously to the measured operation of the
system, to compute estimates of the chlorine concentration bounds which change with time, and the use of this
information to determine the occurrence of an event.
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Fig. 1. The system architecture, the Monte-Carlo Simulations (MCS) Module, and the Event Detection Module.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the design methodology is described, and in Section 3, a case
study on a realistic water distribution system is presented. Finally, Section 4 concludes this work and discusses future
work.
2. Design Methodology
The system architecture is presented in Fig. 1. The Water Distribution Network has actuators and sensors, for
controlling and monitoring chlorine concentrations, and is driven by the partially-known consumer demands d∗(k) ∈
R
Nn at Nn nodes. The output signal y(k) ∈ RNs of the system corresponds to the measured chlorine concentrations at
Ns locations where chlorine concentration sensors are installed. Chlorine concentrations are controlled through the
Controller Module, and for event detection, the Monte-Carlo Simulation (MCS) Module, and the Event Detection
Module are used, as shown in Fig. 1. In the next paragraphs a detailed description of each part of the system is
provided.
2.1. The Water Distribution Network
Following on the formulation in [23], we deﬁne k as the discrete time, with sampling time Δt, v(k) as the average
chlorine concentration state vector and w(k) the as average contaminant concentration state vector, where each state
corresponds to the concentration in a ﬁnite volume within a pipe. Furthermore, we deﬁne u(k) as the controllable
disinfectant concentration input and d∗(k) the consumer water demands. The water distribution system model is
described by
v(k + 1) = fv(v(k), u(k), d(k); p) + gv(v(k),w(k); p) (1)
w(k + 1) = fw(w(k), d(k); p) + gw(v(k),w(k); p) + φ(k; pφ) (2)
y(k) = Cv(k) (3)
where fv(·) and fw(·) are the advection functions for the disinfectant and contaminant substances respectively, and
gv(·) and gw(·) are the reaction functions for the disinfectant and contaminant substances respectively. The set p com-
prises all the parameters aﬀecting the system (pipe roughness coeﬃcients, structural parameters, reaction coeﬃcients,
disinfection decay rate); in general, the actual parameters of the set p are unknown (or partially/nominally) known.
Function φ(·) corresponds to the unknown non-negative contamination fault function. The set pφ is comprised of the
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contamination fault parameters, such as starting time, duration and magnitude. Finally, y(k) is the output vector and C
is the output matrix. Note that, this mathematical representation of the system is equivalent to the Lagrangian model
used by the EPANET [25,26]. The actual nodal water demands d∗(k) which aﬀect the contaminant and disinfectant
propagation, are not known, but in general they can be described using the periodic nominal demand vector d(·) and
an uncertainty term ηd(k), such that d∗(k) = d(k) + ηd(k).
2.2. Controller Module
Typically, the Water Distribution Network has Controller Module responsible for computing the input signals
u(k) ∈ RNu for the Nu chlorination actuators, with respect to some reference signal r(k) and the system’s measurable
output. In this work, without loss of generality, a time-based control algorithm will be considered, to specify the
chlorine concentration setpoint at the disinfection locations. The input signal u(k), which can be time-varying, is
known and is used by the Monte-Carlo Simulation Module presented in the next subsection.
2.3. Monte-Carlo Simulation (MCS) Module
The Monte-Carlo Simulation (MCS) Module runs in parallel M randomized simulation based on a nominal water
distribution system model, and a nominal water demand model d(k) ∈ RNn , while taking into account the input
signal u(k). For the randomised simulations, a maximum uncertainty percentage vector α is considered, such that
|ηd(k)| ≤ α|d(k)|; for instance, the i-th simulation could use diﬀerent demand patterns computed di(k) = d(k) ± α%,
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. The MCS Module computes at each time-step the matrix Y(k), (e.g. using the EPANET solver) for
which at discrete time k, its (i, j)-th element Y(i, j)(k), is the estimated chlorine concentration at the j-th sensor node,
with respect to the i-th randomized simulation.
2.4. Event Detection Module
The Event Detection Module constructs the detection bounds and applies an detection logic to determine the exis-
tence of a contamination event. By using the matrix Y(k), the upper and lower bound at the j-th sensor node for time
k, Y j(k) and Y j(k) respectively, can be computed as follows:
Y j(k) = min
{
Y(1, j)(k), . . . ,Y(M, j)(k)
}
, (4)
Y j(k) = max
{
Y(1, j)(k), . . . ,Y(M, j)(k)
}
. (5)
As a note, instead of the maximum and minimum bounds, other statistical parameters could be considered, such as the
one the standard deviation (e.g. the 2σ or 3σ bounds). However, there is no guarantee that the random concentrations
computed by the multiple simulations will follow the normal distribution in all time steps.
The event detection logic compares a window of measurements with the corresponding Monte-Carlo simulation
results. In general, an event alarm ﬂag Aj(k) at the j-th sensor node is triggered at time k, if for a time-window
of W measured chlorine concentrations at the j-th sensor node, there are L measurements which are lower than the
lower-bound estimate, or higher than the upper-bound estimate, with respect to the concentrations computed using the
Monte-Carlo simulations. In speciﬁc,
Aj(k) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
True card
({
τ |
[
y j(k − τ) − Y j(k − τ) < 0
]
, τ ∈ {0, . . . ,W − 1}
})
≥ L, or
card
({
τ |
[
y j(k − τ) − Y j(k − τ) > 0
]
, τ ∈ {0, . . . ,W − 1}
})
≥ L
False otherwise
(6)
The event detection time D ∈ RNs is the ﬁrst time instance the event alarm ﬂag at the j-th sensor node was activated,
i.e. Dj = k for Aj(k) = True.
3. Case Study
In the simulation studies of this section, a hydraulic benchmark model based on EPANET and a quality benchmark
model based on EPANET-MSX are used. The hydraulic benchmark corresponds to the ‘Network 1’ which was used as
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Fig. 2. The benchmark water distribution system with 129 nodes.
part of the “Battle of theWater Sensor Networks” design competition [3], depicted in Fig. 2. The network is comprised
of 178 pipes, 126 junctions, two tanks and one reservoir. Realistic parameters are considered for all structural and
hydraulic characteristics. The benchmark assigns for each junction, a nominal water consumption volume, d(k), of
48-hours duration and with 30-minute hydraulic time-step. The quality benchmark is based on the model used in [22]
for simulating reactions of Chlorine and Arsenite in drinking water. The water distribution network is assumed to use
chlorine disinfection, and chlorine disinfection actuators are considered at two locations, the ‘Reservoir’ and ‘Tank
A’, as shown in Fig. 2. In this case-study, all the hydraulic and quality models are simulated using the EPANET
and the EPANET-MSX toolkits, within the Matlab programming environment. The MSX solver uses the ﬁfth-order
Runge-Kutta method with a 10-minute time-step.
The placement of the ﬁve chlorine sensors is based on a Pareto optimal solution proposed in the “Battle of theWater
Sensor Networks” competition [3,27]. In speciﬁc, water quality sensors are considered at nodes ‘17’, ‘31’, ‘45’, ‘83’
and ‘122’, computed with respect to four objectives, for: 1) maximizing the detection likelihood, 2) minimizing
the expected detection time, 3) minimizing the expected population aﬀected and 4) minimizing the consumption
of contaminated water prior to detection. Considering single contamination events which can occur at any node at
any time within one day, with 5-minute sampling time, in total 37,152 contamination scenarios can be constructed
(129 nodes × 288 samples), for which the sensor placement scheme used is able to detect (given an ideal contaminant
sensor), 75.6% of all the constructed scenarios. This means that 24.4% of all constructed contamination events cannot
be detected using this sensor placement scheme, and thus more sensors would be required to increase coverage.
The case study involves the simulation of 8 days of operation of the realistic water distribution network. The
benchmark system is initially randomized with d∗(k) = d(k)± 10% uncertainty in all water demand outﬂows; and this
is considered to be unknown as it corresponds to the realistic system.
The Controller Module is based on a simple scheduling rule for specifying the input signal:
u(k) =
{
1 mg/L if k < 3 days, k ≥ 5 days
0.5 mg/L if 3 days ≤ k < 5 days (7)
A key feature which will be demonstrated in this case study, is that the contamination event detection method does
not trigger false alarms caused due the rapid reduction of chlorine, when this can be explained due to a change in the
input.
The MCS Module performs 50 simulations with randomized parameters. In this case study, α = 30% is considered
as the maximum uncertainty bound. In practice this bound would be computed based on historical data and should be
high enough to reduce the false alarms (false positives), and in the same time low enough to reduce the misses (false
negatives). Fig. 3 depicts the chlorine concentration in two sensor nodes during the normal operation, along with the
upper and lower bounds of the minimum and maximum concentrations computed using the Monte-Carlo simulations.
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Fig. 3. Chlorine concentration at node ‘31’ and ‘45’.
For convenience, the 2σ bounds are also provided. As observed in the Fig. 3, the variability in the chlorine concen-
tration changes (see bounds at node ‘45’ between the days 5 and 5.5, in comparison with the bounds between the days
6.5 and 7. The Event Detection Module triggers an alarm when, for a window of W = 3 measurements, the L = 2
measurements are below the lower threshold, or above the upper threshold.
To evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed methodology, randomized simulations were conducted to measure the
ability in detecting quality events. From the set of 37,152 contamination scenarios, the top-10% worst-case scenarios
were selected, with respect to the possible volume of contaminated water consumed, and by changing the time step
from 5-minutes to 30-minutes, 639 scenarios were constructed. All events are assumed to occur within the 4-th day,
and have step dynamics, i.e. the contaminant concentration is constant at the injection location until the simulation
ends. To allow for comparisons, the hydraulic conditions have remained the same in all scenarios. Arsenite reacts
with Chlorine through a bilinear reaction term, which depends on various parameters, such as pH; in this work the
reaction rates are considered to remain constant. The injected Arsenite As(III) concentration is selected randomly
from a uniform distribution [0, 1] mg/l. The reaction terms were taken from the literature [22].
The results are provided in Table 1. Each row corresponds to the range of Arsenite concentration, and the second
column provides the number of events simulated for each range. In total, 81.7% of the 639 events were detected
correctly (True Positives) within ‘Day 1’ after their occurrence, and for the next two days, the total percentage of
correct detections increase with a smaller percentage, to 84.5% and 86.9% for detections up to Day-2 and Day-3
respectively. The average detection time was 9.8 hours, from all detections occurring within the ﬁrst 3 days. As
expected, in larger contaminant concentrations, the detection rate is improved when considering longer time delays,
than in comparison with smaller concentrations. For reference, a snapshot of the simulation is provided in Fig. 4,
comparing the chlorine concentrations at the 5 sensor nodes, the upper and lower bounds (gray area), the event starting
time (horizontal black line) and the instances when the event logic was triggered (red lines).
4. Discussion and Conclusions
The present work describes a model-based approach for contamination event detection in water distribution sys-
tems. The proposed method takes into account the known chlorine input signals, and by using multiple Monte-Carlo
simulations which run in parallel to the real system, it produces bounds of the expected chlorine concentration at the
diﬀerent sensing locations, at each time step. The sensor measurements are then compared with the estimated bounds
and an event logic raises an event alarm ﬂag when these bounds are violated in accordance to a certain rule.
The case study demonstrated the application of the methodology on a realistic water distribution benchmark, taking
into account uncertainties involved in the water demands which can aﬀect water quality dynamics dramatically. The
results illustrate that the method is capable of changing the detection bounds when the chlorine concentration input
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Table 1. Simulation Results
Arsenite concentration Events Day-1 detection Day-2 detection Day-3 detection Mean Day-3 Detection
(mg/L) Simulated (%) (%) (%) Time (hours)
0–0.1 63 66.7 68.3 69.8 9.7
0.1–0.2 62 74.2 74.2 80.6 11.4
0.2–0.3 74 82.4 83.8 85.1 8.2
0.3–0.4 76 82.9 82.9 84.2 8.4
0.4–0.5 57 80.7 84.2 86.0 10.5
0.5–0.6 65 84.6 92.3 93.8 11.8
0.6–0.7 70 87.1 88.6 90.0 8.9
0.7–0.8 72 87.5 93.1 95.8 10.0
0.8–0.9 54 88.9 88.9 90.7 8.2
0.9–0.1 46 80.4 89.1 93.5 11.9
Total 639 81.7 84.5 86.9 9.8
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Fig. 4. Example of Arsenite injection at ‘Junction 30’ with concentration 0.2 mg/L at day 4 (00:30).
has changed. In the speciﬁc case study, the method was able to detect most contamination events within 1–3 days,
and did not produce any false positives.
Future research will investigate the sensitivity of the approach to a wider range of uncertainties on other param-
eters in addition to demands, as well as evaluate the method on a real water distribution system with real chlorine
measurements.
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